Abstract. Switching costs and innovation are two major issues in economics. Prior research demonstrates the effects of switching costs on competition, but ignores the influence of switching costs to firm innovation. So the purpose of this study is to reveal the relationships between switching costs and cost-reducing innovation by considering brand loyalty. All our theoretical conclusions are captured by game theory based on a two-stage duopoly model. The conclusions of this study show that under moderate conditions, switching costs improve competition. Strong firms implement lower price when switching costs are present than when they are not present. Second, at the asymmetric equilibrium, lower-efficiency firms with switching costs launch less innovative investments than do those without switching costs, while higher-efficiency firms with switching costs launch more innovation. But under symmetric equilibrium, switching costs have no effect on innovative investment. The novel contributions of this paper are that we find switching costs and loyalty have vertical impacts on firms' cost-reducing innovation, which extends the theory of switching costs.
Introduction
When consumers attempt to change a brand, switching costs arise as either contractual obligations or specific costs incurred to replace or to reacquire products. Switching costs are notably common, and it is crucial to capture their effects. Burnham, Krels, & Mahajan (2003) identify three types of switching costs based on many social phenomena: procedural switching costs, financial switching costs and relational switching costs.
The relationship between switching costs and competition is a notably important topic in the fields of economics and management and has attracted extensive attention. But no consistent conclusions about the relationship between switching costs and competition are achieved. Besides, existed study of this issue has not take full consideration of innovation and brand loyalty, while these two factors have important influence on the relationship between switching costs and competition. The major purpose of this study is to fill up the gap we mentioned above and the novel contributions of this paper fall in two aspects as following.
First, we reveal the effects of switching costs on firm's exploitative innovation, cost-reducing innovation. Cost-reducing innovation means firm invest in innovation to reduce it production costs. Lower cost enable firm to reduce its price and plunder consumers from the competitor. Higher switching costs diminish the advantages of strong firms, but stimulate weak firms to improve their position by innovation. In other words, switching costs along with innovation reduce the difference between different efficiency firms.
Second, brand loyalty is important in innovation competition and we demonstrate the notable effects of loyalty on exploitative innovation. Loyalty has asymmetric influence to different efficiency firms. Comparing with lower-efficiency firms, higher-efficiency firms have more motivation to enforce innovation under switching costs because switching costs deter consumers to change product from different firm. And please notice that brand loyalty in our paper is different from the prior studies, such as Klemperer (1987) because we issue that brand loyalty only has long-term effects on competition but has no influence on new consumers.
In general, large switching costs lock in a buyer after an initial purchase. This study further examines this relationship under innovative investment. No price discrimination is introduced in this work. Because there are rare papers regarding innovation with switching costs, this paper fills this gap in the body of research and shows that switching costs yield lower prices. At the asymmetric equilibrium, switching costs cause lower innovative investment for firms with lower efficiency and higher innovation for firms with higher efficiency. At the symmetric equilibrium, switching costs have no relation with innovative investment. Our assumption of the convex cost functions is very popular in microeconomics and industrial organization.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Literature review is launched in Section 1. A two-period model is established in Section 2. The model is subsequently discussed, highlighting the relationships between switching costs and both competition and innovation in Section 3. Further discussion is outlined in Section 4. Concluding remarks are presented in the final section.
Literature review
The effects of switching costs on competition are not consistent in different studies. For example, Klemperer (1995) hypothesizes that switching costs make the market less competitive. Many other papers concerning switching costs also conclude that they make a market less competitive. But there is also extensive research on the positive effects of switching costs on competition. Dubé, Hitsch, & Rossi (2009) challenge the presumption of Klemperer (1995) .
These authors propose a conclusion derived from numerical simulation that concludes that switching costs yield more competition. Cabral (2009) establishes a rational model to explain these phenomena successfully. Doganoglu (2010) further highlights switching costs with uncertain demands and also concludes that small switching costs improve competition. Viard (2007) also confirms that switching costs yield more competition. Considering switching costs, Shen and Su (2015) recently compared the contracts.
In their interesting survey paper, Farrell and Klemperer (2007) remark on significant conclusions related to switching costs and conclude that switching costs improve price. Chen (1997) develops a useful two-stage model with two firms to analyze switching costs and price discrimination strategies for old customers versus new ones. There is no shortage of discussion of switching costs in the literature, most of which highlight switching costs with dynamic problems. Morita and Waldman (2010) discuss monopoly maintenance with switching costs and explain the relationship between efficiency and monopolization. Wang and Wen (1998) address switching costs faced by a new entrant. Chen and Pearcy (2010) discuss brand switching in dynamic environments. Capone, Malerba, & Orsenigo (2013) examined the relationship between switching costs and first-move advantage. Haj-Salem and Chebat (2014) pointed two effects of switching costs. Fischer and Ross (2014) examined the switching costs in material substitution projects. Jabarnejad and Valenzuela (2016) remarked that the switching costs exist in electric transmission systems. This paper closely relates to innovation literature. For innovative investment, this study refers to the interesting papers of Sacco and Schmutzler (2011), Chen, Nie, and Wang (2015) , Nie and Chen (2012) , Nie (2014) , Chen, Nie and Huang (2017) , Chen, Nie, and Wen (2015b) , Nie, Yang, Chen, and Wang (2016) , Nie (2018) , Chen and Sappington (2010) , Yang, Nie, Liu, and Shen (2018) , Nie, Wang, Chen, and Chen (2018) , Chen, Wen, Wang, and Nie (2017) and Vives (2008) . Chen and Sappington (2010) argue that vertical integration (VI) generally enhances innovation under downstream Cournot competition. Nie and Yang (2015) , and, Wang, Nie, Peng, and Li (2017) discussed the relationship between subsidy and innovative investment. Farrell and Saloner (1985) point out that there is always excess inertia under a platform of incomplete information. This study further discusses this topic in detail with a two-period model.
Model with switching costs and innovation
The model's goal is to capture the relationship between switching costs and innovative investment. We refer to a two-period model combined with the innovative investment of Sacco and Schmutzler (2011) . This study highlights effects of switching costs on innovation, which differs from Dubé et al. (2009) and Cabral (2009 
All consumers may buy a unit product, and the market size is no more than 1 . This paper addresses switching costs based on brand loyalty. This paper assumes either that new consumers have no knowledge of brand value or that brand value has no effect on new consumers. 0 1 u = is a constant, which means the maximum reservation utility for all consumers, and 0 u ρ = ρ stands for the utility of a consumer with parameter [0,1] ρ∈ with which to consume a unit product. The utility value, for certain consumers consuming from firm i at the first period for 1,2 i = , is:
(1)
is a random variable observing uniform distribution that reflects the wealthlevel of consumers. Consumers buy products if and only if 
Eq. (2) implies that the utility value is increased if this consumer changes their product. Moreover, a consumer changes their product and he/she regards the degree of brand loyalty to a new product to be zero. Some consumers entering into this market at period 2 buy only products with lower prices, and the utility value of these consumers is
represents output quantity of two firms at period t for 1,2 t = . Two firms launch innovative investment at the first stage and the marginal cost of the two firms at the second period is determined by both innovative investment at the first period and the product quantity at the second period. Two firms identically price at the first stage, or c I is the cost incurred to produce a unit product of firm i at period 2. Discounting factors of the two firms are identical and are held at 1 to simplify the model. This study on switching costs is based on (2), and the net profit of firm i, for 1,2 i = , is:
I is the cost of innovative investment incurred by firm i , which is similar to Sacco and Schmutzler (2011) . 
Eq. (4) means that the output of firm i at the second period is equal to the output of the first period plus the change in output of the rival firm, plus new consumers gained at the second period, minus consumers changing from firm i to other firms.
For convenience, we must abstract from other important factors discussed in the literature, such as holdup and others. By virtue of duopoly, market clearing conditions always hold. Moreover, the following assumption is launched.
is convex such that (3) is concave in i I to guarantee the existence of optimal innovative investment.
(0)
i c c = implies that the cost is not changed without innovative investment. Chen (1997) develops a model with two periods and two firms to capture switching costs, arriving at a number of interesting conclusions. However, Chen (1997) addresses price discrimination, while this study highlights innovation under switching cost.
In this game, at the first period, two firms price and determine innovative investment, and consumers decide to buy products from one firm. If there is no difference between the two firms, consumers buy products randomly. At the second stage, the two firms price and consumers in this market decide whether to change products or not, and new consumers enter this industry.
Model analysis
In these calculations, we use the model in the above section to find an equilibrium solution. At the first period, . By backward induction, the second period is addressed first followed by the first period.
The second period
The second period is discussed in several cases. 
. We further achieve: p . There exists a unique solution under this situation, which is determined by the first optimal conditions that satisfy the following: 
From the above equations, we achieve: 
1 π is concave in 1 2 p and the optimal strategy is determined by the following equation.
. We further have:
In this situation, the second firm exits this market and the first firm acts as a monopolist at the second period. p p > , we have similar conclusions, and a similarly detailed discussion is omitted.
The first period
At the first period, the two firms' strategy sets are all S = {optimally pricing, following rival's price}. Therefore, the profit function is non-smooth. In this calculation, we address each element of the Nash equilibrium separately. For innovative investment, we find, if
Eq. (18) is the first optimal conditions of (5)- (6) and (9)- (10).
Eq. (19) is the first optimal conditions of (15) 
, we further assume that
When two firms price identically, customers randomly buy products, and the expected quantity of products that will be sold is identical. To simplify, we assume that the quantity produced by two firms is identical. In this case, two firms determine their price according to the corresponding optimal price and the rival's price. According to the above system, obviously, the profit function of the first firm is concave in 1 p . The profit function of the second firm is also concave in 2 p for all 0 u . After one firm launches a lower price, the other firms follow suit. The first optimal conditions of the first firm are:
Conversely,
The first optimal conditions of the second firm are 
In this case, profit functions of the two firms are all concave. The first optimal conditions of the two firms are:
From the profit of the firms, we immediately achieve: 
The second equality comes from the relation I are all monotonically decreasing in s. The conclusion is reached, and the proof is complete. Remarks: This proposition illustrates that switching costs promote competition to attract consumers in the first period. This conclusion is highly consistent with the numerical simulation in Dubé et al. (2009) and supports their conclusions using another approach.
At the second period, as both firms aim to improve market share, larger switching costs yield a lower price for strong firms and a higher price for weak ones. Moreover, weak firms have more incentive to reduce price at the initial period than do strong firms. Under higher switching costs, there is less innovative investment by strong firms, while there is more innovative investment by weak ones.
There is an explanation for these phenomena. Higher switching costs diminish the advantages of strong firms, while innovation improves the position of weak firms. Accounting for innovation reduces the differences between firms.
In these calculations, we address the relationship between the cost of production and the price at the second stage. p p < . Innovative investment by firms with lower efficiency under switching costs is lower than it would be without switching costs, while innovative investment by firms with higher efficiency under switching costs is higher than it would be without switching costs.
Proof: The conclusion follows directly from the first statement of Proposition 1 as it applies to the case of s = 0. ■ Remarks: This proposition concludes that switching costs bring about lower price, which is consistent with the numerical results of Cabral (2009 ), Doganoglu (2010 and Viard (2007) with moderate assumptions. These interesting conclusions are consistent with social phenomena. Actually, higher market share drives this conclusion. Additionally, under switching costs, firms of higher efficiency launch more innovative investment, and firms with lower efficiency reduce innovative investment. The explanation of these conclusions is similar to that of Proposition 1. Without switching costs, strong firms hold and exploit advantageous roles. Switching costs reduces the difference between firms, and strong firms lose a corresponding portion of their advantages.
In summary, under switching costs, strong firms price lower than they would without switching costs at both stages, while weak firms price lower at the first stage and higher at the second stage than they would without switching costs. Switching costs protect weak firms to launch less innovative investment and stimulate strong firms' innovation. This is consistent with the empirical studies about China. Fang, Lerner and Wu (2017) studied the private firms (high efficiency firms) and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) with low efficiency. The intellectual property right (IPR) protection (which is the switching costs in this article) affects the innovation. Fang et al. (2017) identified that switching costs (IPR protection) strengthens firms' incentives to innovate and that strong (private sector) firms are more sensitive to IPR protection than weak firms (SOEs). According to data from China, Fang et al. (2017) compares firms' patenting rates of private firms and SOES. This table is collected from the interesting paper of Fang et al. (2017) . 
Further discussion
We now address the symmetric case. In this case, 
